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In this paper we study the policy interactions between meeting a greenhouse gas emission constraint and 
local air pollution policies. We use a partial equilibrium model of a national energy market to address 
three questions. First what is the greenhouse gas emission reduction one can expect if one pursues local 
air pollution objectives only? Second what ancillary local air pollution benefits can be expected if the 
only policy goal is to reduce the emission of greenhouse gasses? Third, what are the efficiency gains if 
both policy goals are pursued jointly?  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A policy to reduce greenhouse gasses emissions has not only an impact at global level but can also 
bring benefits locally by reducing other air pollutants linked to energy consumption. This has two 
attractive features. First the benefits of the reduction of local air pollutants will accrue to the current 
rather than to the future generations. Secondly, the reduction in local pollution damage will go to a 
large extent to the population undertaking the mitigation actions. Many European countries are 
committed to reach the Kyoto obligations but real action has been slow up to now. Given that local air 
pollution policies offer more immediate rewards to the policy makers, the potential association of local 
air pollution benefits to climate change policy raises three interesting questions. First if we pursue only 
local air pollution benefits, what is the GHG reduction we can expect? Second if we pursue as only 
policy goal the reduction of GHG emissions, what ancillary benefits can we expect in the form of local 
air pollution benefits. Finally assume that we pursue a GHG reduction policy and a local air pollution 
policy simultaneously, is this a different policy? and has this policy a better benefit-cost ratio? 
It is well known that the ancillary benefits question can be formulated in many different ways 
(Rübbelke, 2002). In this paper we look at the problems of a national policy maker that faces a GHG 
reduction constraint and considers the damage of local air pollution. We explore this setting formally 
in section 2 of this paper. To illustrate the policy questions, we use a model for the energy sector. The 
supply, transformation and consumption of different energy sources are indeed the dominant source of 
GHG emissions and also the main source for the emission of conventional pollutants. This model is 
presented in section 3 of this paper. In section 4 we discuss briefly the estimation of the local air 
pollution benefits. In section 4 we discuss the three policy questions we raised earlier using the 
simulation results. In section 5 we conclude.      
2.  THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK  
For illustration purposes, we consider the market for only one energy service (home heating, car 
kilometres etc.). This demand Q can be satisfied by an energy production Q(E,I) that uses two inputs: 
primary energy E and other inputs I (say insulation, more efficient engines etc.). The production of 
energy services generates two pollutants. The first is say CO2, with emissions proportional to the level 
of energy used and the second is say SO2, for which specific abatement efforts can be made
2. The 
specific abatement efforts are denoted srs and they represent the emission reduction efforts per unit of 
energy. The benefits of energy use are given by the gross consumer surplus S(Q), the area under the 
inverse demand function. The costs of energy use are given by the constant marginal costs for energy 
and other inputs and by the abatement cost function per unit of energy use Cs (srs ). This cost function 
is convex.  
The total emissions of CO2 are constrained by an absolute cap EC
GHG . This formulation is appropriate 
as GHG emissions are regulated via internationally agreed caps and as the local gain of extra emission 
reductions is low for a pollutant with worldwide damage
3. The emissions of the local air pollutant SO2 
are not constrained but they generate damages proportional to the level of emissions. This damage 
does not interfere with the demand for energy services.   
We assume that there are no other market distortions in the economy and that the policy maker is 
interested in the unweighed sum of benefits and costs of his policy
4. The best he can achieve is to 
choose the level of E, I and srs such that the difference between gross consumer surplus and costs of 
inputs and local environmental damage is maximised given the CO2 emission constraint.  
  
                                                      
2  the SO2 abatement technologies are assumed not to increase directly energy consumption and hence CO2 emissions. 
3  An alternative formulation would take into account an international market for GHG permits. In this case the permit price can be seen as 
a constant marginal damage (or revenue foregone) of GHG emissions.    
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where  Q  demand for an energy service, e.g. heating 
  () SQ  the consumer surplus (surface under the demand curve) 
  , Ie p p   the prices of other inputs and primary energy 
  λ   the marginal cost of the GHF emission reduction constraint 
  , I E   the production inputs 
  () s s Cs r  cost, per unit of energy,  of SO2 emission abatement  
  ds p   damage from SO2 emissions, assumed constant here 
  , es ec  emission coefficients of SO2 (before abatement efforts) and CO2 per unit of energy 
input 
At the optimum and assuming an internal solution, the first best policy is characterised by three first 
order conditions.  
The marginal benefit (in terms of energy services) of other inputs I, has to equal its cost. If energy and 
other inputs are substitutes, this condition shows that when energy inputs are more expensive, other 









The marginal benefit (in terms of energy services) of energy inputs E, has to equal its full cost. The 
full cost consists of the resource cost of energy, the costs of air pollution abatement, the associated 
remaining local air pollution damage and the shadow cost of meeting the GHG emission constraint:  
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Finally, we have the condition for the optimal abatement of local air pollution: the cost of increasing  













In our formulation, where the marginal damage of local air pollution is taken constant and where the 
abatement process itself does not require any energy services, the optimal level of local air pollutants 
abatement per unit of energy is independent of the GHG emission reduction constraint.  
Let us now consider the three policy questions that are of interest to us. Take first the case where only 
local air pollution objectives are pursued. This means that only condition (5) holds. Obviously there 
will always be an impact on energy use and GHG emissions in our illustrative model because 
condition (4) that governs energy input use will take into account the marginal SO2 abatement cost 
and the remaining damage. The impact of local air pollution policies on the total GHG emissions will 
only be important if specific SO2 abatement policies are either inefficient so that the remaining local 
air pollution damage is large either very costly.      3 
 
Consider next the case where only a GHG reduction policy exists. The associated local air pollution 
savings may be important if there was no local air pollution policy in place or if it was very costly. 
Indeed, in that case the reduction efforts for local air pollution (srs ) will be small or zero and the air 
pollution damage of every unit of energy used will be large so that energy saving produces large 
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Figure 1: Interaction between Local air pollution policy and GHG policies 
The case where both policies are in place means that in the condition that governs the use of energy 
(4) one has minimised the right hand side by increasing the abatement of local air pollution to the 
optimal level as specified in (5). An important consequence of the optimisation of local air pollution 
policy is that the ancillary benefit of GHG reduction becomes smaller. In other terms the marginal 
welfare cost of reducing GHG emissions has increased. 
These properties can be illustrated graphically if one assumes that the production of energy services 
does not allow substitution by other inputs so that the reduction of energy services is the only way to 
reduce GHG emissions. In Figure 1 we show how pursuing only local air pollution benefits leads to an 
energy use level (and associated GHG emission) E 
AIR POLL that is the result of a social marginal cost 
(at level D) equal to the marginal abatement cost per unit of energy plus the remaining air pollution 
damage plus the energy resource costs. The net benefit of pursuing this local air pollution policy 
equals the sum of two terms: the reduced damage per unit of energy consumption for the remaining 
energy consumption (ABCD) + the excess of air pollution damage over the consumption value for the 
suppressed energy consumption (BEFC). 
When we add a GHG emission constraint, the most interesting case is where the GHG constraint 
remains active when an optimum local air pollution policy was already in place: where E 
AIR POLL  > E    4 
 
GHG . When there is no local air pollution policy in place, the total cost of reaching the GHG emission 
constraint equals GFH and this total cost can easily turn into a benefit when local air pollution benefits 
are taken into account (GFH minus saved air pollution damage IEFH). The marginal cost of reducing 
GHG emissions has become very small (GI instead of GJ and could have been negative if the desired 
GHG emission reduction was smaller). 
The net total cost of a GHG policy when there is already an optimal local air pollution policy in place 
is much larger: it equals GCJ. Also the net marginal cost of reaching the GHG emission limit is much 
larger: it equals now GJ (rather than GI).      
This framework can be extended to cover more complex local air pollution damage functions and 
substitution between energy sources. Our simple analytical framework conveys a few insights that will 
be useful to understand the numerical results of the later sections: 
1.  Local air pollution benefits can reduce strongly  the cost of GHG policies. 
2.  When air pollution policies are not optimised, the net total cost of a GHG policy can be 
negative (become a benefit) and its marginal cost can be small or negative 
3.  When an optimal local air pollution is in place, the total cost and the marginal cost of a GHG 
policy is larger than without an optimal local air pollution policy.   
3.  THE MODEL USED 
The environmental problems considered in this study, global warming and local air pollution, are both 
linked to energy consumption and their abatement possibilities are interrelated. For this reason we 
have selected a partial equilibrium model for the energy market to study the policy questions. 
The partial equilibrium model (MARKAL) represents all energy demand and supply activities and 
technologies for Belgium with a horizon of up to 40 years, with their associated emissions (CO2, SO2, 
NOx, VOC and PM). We describe briefly the scope of the model, the modelling principle, the demand 
and supply of energy, the construction of a reference scenario and the major background assumptions 
used.  
3.1.  Scope of the Markal model
5 
Markal computes for the period 1990-2030 market equilibria for the Belgian energy market with a 
time interval of 5 years. Markal covers all activities from import of energy, transformation into 
secondary energy, transport and distribution up to the transformation of final energy (at the 
consumers’ end) into energy services.  
There are some 40 different types of energy services to be satisfied. These include all energy services 
ranging from delivery of process heat to some industrial sectors up to home heating and electricity 
demand for household appliances. This demand for energy services is satisfied by investing and 
operating a few hundred technologies of demand (energy saving etc.) and supply (power plants etc). 
3.2. Modelling  principle 
The basic idea is to compute market equilibria for the period 1990-2030 by maximising the discounted 
sum of consumer and producer surpluses subject to technological feasibility constraints, constraints on 
available production capacity and subject to policy constraints. The policy constraints can be overall 
emission constraints (Kyoto), a ban on certain technologies (e.g. nuclear), existing taxes etc.. 
                                                      
5  The Markal model has been implemented in Belgium with support of the Federal Science Office by CES-KULeuven and VITO since 
1990. The current use is covered by the ‘Global Change and Sustainable Development’ research program of the Science Policy Office, 
contract n°GC/DD/221 and 222”.The Markal model structure is the product of 20 year cooperation in ETSAP, which is an implementing 
agreement of the IEA and the model is used in 25 countries for energy policy analysis.     5 
 
This ambitious and global approach has a cost in terms of a simplified representation of energy users 
and producers in the model. It is assumed that there is perfect coordination between demand and 
supply on the basis of social marginal costs. This implies that there are no transaction costs and that all 
agents share the same subjective beliefs, that they are rational and finally that they use ‘prices’ equal 
to the discounted marginal costs corrected for imputed shadow prices.  
The model is a long-term model: the period 1990-2030 is covered through successive 5-year periods, 
and the different periods are linked through residual capacities. The costs in the different periods are 
weighted using a discount factor. The use of a 5% discount rate can be justified to reflect a ‘social’ 
time preference rate and to analyse the optimal decisions for the society as a whole. In scenarios, 
which should reflect more the behaviour of the consumers and producers as individual private agents, 
a 10% discount rate is more appropriate, corresponding approximately to an average payback period 
of 7 years. In all scenarios in this study the discount rate has been set to 10%. Perfect foresight is 
assumed for all economic agents. 
This modelling principle allows us to sketch what can be the best response and economic cost of 
certain energy and environment policies. We use as illustrative example: a cap on total GHG 
emissions. 
A cap on total GHG emissions in Belgium implies the following type of effects in the model: 
−  the model puts a shadow cost (that can be seen as a carbon tax) on all GHG emissions in Belgium, 
−  the shadow cost or tax implies an adaptation of energy supply processes where new investments 
are less GHG intensive, this makes electricity, heat and traditional final energy deliveries more 
expensive 
−  the users of energy, confronted with more expensive final energy, react in two ways: they invest in 
energy saving equipment and /or in fuel switching and secondly they react by reducing their 
demand for energy services (say less car driving, lower indoor temperatures etc.)   
−  this whole process is continued until the global GHG emission cap is met at the lowest cost for 
society 
−  in the cost concept one can take into account all production costs (investment, operation including 
fuel) but also other external costs (say local air pollution costs)  
The cost of this emission constraint will consist in the discounted cost of extra investments, operation 
(excluding taxes and subsidies), benefits of saved external costs (local air pollution damage) and the 
loss of comfort for those energy users that found it better to reduce their demand for energy services 
(for economists: the loss in consumer surplus of private energy users and the increase of production 
costs for the industrial energy users). 
3.3.  Demand for energy services 
We distinguish two demand concepts, the demand for energy services and the final energy demand. 
The final energy demand corresponds to the delivery of energy products (oil products, gas, coal, and 
electricity) to the consumers (non-energy producing firms, households). This final energy demand is 
one of the inputs into the production of energy services (heated homes, industrial process heat,...). The 
model is driven by the demand functions for energy services. These demand functions give the level of 
energy services demanded as a function of their cost. E.g. in the case of home heating the cost of 
heating the house corresponds to the price of gasoil corrected by an energy conversion efficiency that 
is itself a function of consumer investments in heating appliances and home insulation. Movements 
along the demand curve for energy services correspond to non specified substitution outside the 
energy system, with other inputs (capital, labour and materials) or other products in the industrial 
sector or with other goods (or comfort) for the consumers. The price elasticities of the demand for 
energy services are derived from literature overview. As most of the studies concern the price 
elasticity of final energy demand and not of energy services, a correction has been applied to take into 
account that part of the substitution possibilities (e.g. by investing in energy saving or more efficient    6 
 
equipment) which are modelled within Markal. The position of the demand curves for energy services 
is determined by exogenous factors, such as the level of income or of equipment (electric appliances, 
number of houses, cars, etc.) for households or the level of industrial activity for firms. These 
exogenous parameters depend on the macroeconomic assumptions underlying a study. 
For the industrial sectors, the price elasticities are derived from a study on the estimation of production 
functions for the industrial sectors in Belgium. They give a price elasticity of final energy demand 
varying from –0.4 to –0.8. A figure of –0.35 has been chosen for all industrial sectors, correcting for 
the substitution possibilities within Markal.  
For the households, the elasticities are –0.3  For the transport sector, a literature review gave a price 
elasticity of transport activity of–0.3.  
3.4.  Supply of energy services  
The supply of energy services is the result of primary energy inputs that are transformed into energy 
services by activities and processes.  
a)  Sources of primary energy supply 
The sources of supply of energy cover all means by which energy can enter or leave the system (other 
than to meet energy demands). The sources of supply are distinguished by type of energy, cost, origin 
and environmental characteristics (e.g. sulphur content of coal). The national production possibilities 
can have an absolute limit or can be available at rising marginal costs. 
b) Energy  activities/technologies 
The energy activities are described through technologies. Three types of technologies are generally 
distinguished : 
1.  conversion technologies: load dependent plants generating electricity or district heat 
2.  process technologies: all other transformation activities, load-independent and environmental 
technologies 
3.  demand technologies: all devices consuming energy to meet energy services demands 
Environmental activities are represented through technologies such as CO2 removal, desulphurisation 
and denitrification, catalytic converters for cars and trucks. 
The technologies are characterised by the following information: 
1.  technical parameters : efficiency of the process, links between inputs and outputs, joint output 
ratios etc. 
2.  capacity parameters : earliest investment date (for new technologies), lifetime of the 
technology, maximum growth ratio or maximum capacity addition per period, residual 
installed capacity, bounds 
3.  cost parameters : investment cost per unit of capacity, fixed maintenance cost, variable costs, 
delivery costs 
4.  availability parameters : forced outage, maintenance etc. 
5.  environmental characteristics : emission ratios per type of process for the 6 pollutants 
considered (CO, CO2, SO2, NOx, VOC and PM). 
3.5.  Construction of a reference scenario 
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Figure 2: Construction of the reference scenario 
It consists of the following steps: 
Step 1: Build a scenario for exogenous economic factors  
The main exogenous factors are the international energy prices and the overall growth level of 
economic activity. International energy prices have been derived from simulations with the POLES 
model
6 that represents the world energy scene.  
Step 2: Build a scenario for EU and Belgium economic activity 
Here the GEM-E3 model
7, a general equilibrium model for the 15 EU countries, is used to construct a 
scenario that is consistent with the exogenous energy price and growth assumptions of step 1. The 
resulting medium term economic growth for Belgium is calibrated to make sure it is in the line with 
the Belgium Planning Office forecasts. This gives a trend of economic activity by sector and a trend in 
disposable income that has a macro-economic consistency. These trends in economic activity and in 
                                                      
6  Poles is a model, developed for DG Research under the Joule research program, that represents the world energy demand and supply. 
(POLES 2.2, Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems, IEPE (Institut d'Economie et de Politique de l'Energie – CNRS,  
7  The GEM-E3 model is a general equilibrium macroeconomic model for the 15 countries of the EU, developed for the European 
Commission (DG Research - Joule research program) (Capros et al, 1999)     8 
 
income are then translated into trends for the demand for energy services (tons of steel, km driven, 
etc..), which determine the shift of the demand curves for these services in MARKAL over the horizon 
considered. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3 where we represent the demand and supply of energy services for any 
sector A.  The MARKAL model has been calibrated to represent the energy market equilibrium in 
1990: the demand, supply and cost curves of energy services have to pass through point B and the 
corresponding level of demand of energy services is X°. In order to know the demand for energy 
services in the reference scenario, we need to know what is the level of activity in sector A in the 
future. GEM-E3 gives us this information and this is translated in the MARKAL model as a shift in 
the demand curve to the right (for an increase). In step 3 this information is combined with 
information about the change in the cost of energy services to obtain a reference level of energy 
services X
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Figure 3: Demand and Supply of Energy Services 
Step 3: Build a detailed scenario for energy use and energy production in Belgium 
In this step, given the demand for energy services computed with the trends from step 2 and the base 
year (1990) demand, MARKAL simulates the choice of energy efficiency by energy users, their fuel 
choice, as well as the choice of energy production processes by the energy sector. The final result of 
this step is primary energy use and GHG emissions. In this step one uses information on the present 
and future availability of energy technologies, their costs and performance at the level of the energy 
user and at the level of the energy producer. 
In terms of Figure 3 this step determines the cost of energy services in 2010 (as well as for all other 
years between 1990 and 2030) and the level of demand for energy services, the point X
1, and translates 
this into energy efficiency, fuel choice, energy sector activity, primary energy use and emissions. The 
demand functions for energy services play an important role in the construction of policy scenarios. 
Every policy scenario that affects the energy sector will alter the marginal cost of energy services and 
this will affect the level of demand for energy services. The demand function for energy services is a 
short cut to represent all substitution and behavioural reactions outside the energy use and production 
sector. 
Step 4: Simulate a  policy scenario     9 
 
Here we take the economic growth, its sectoral allocation and the international energy prices as given. 
Also the shifts of the demand curve over time are those defined in the reference scenario. Then the 
policy scenario is introduced, this will give rise to other social costs of energy and movements along 
the demand curves defined in Figure 3. As an example, to introduce a policy to reach Kyoto, this will 
imply a movement along the demand curve in 2010 from C to D. 
3.6. Major  Assumptions 
3.6.1.  Primary energy prices 
Table 1 summarises the growth and energy price assumptions used in this study. They are derived 
from results with the world energy model Poles.  
Table 1: Growth and Energy Prices Assumptions (annual average growth rate) 
  2000/2005 2005/2010 2010/2020 2020/2030 
OECD  GDP  2.5% 2.4% 2.0% 1.6% 
Oil  ($90/bl)  2.6% 2.5% 2.5% 1.8% 
Gas ($90/boe)          
European  market  4.2% 4.2% 3.6% 2.4% 
Coal  0%  0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 
 
3.6.2.  Macro-economic activity variables 
The sectoral activity levels and the growth in housing stock and private income (reflected in private 
consumption evolution) are the main determinants for the evolution in the demand for energy services 
in our reference scenario. Table 2 summarises the main assumptions. 
Table 2: Macroeconomic background and sectoral evolution for Belgium (average annual 
growth rate) 
    1999/2005  2005/2010  2010/2030 
Macroeconomic background 
 GDP  growth    2.2   2.1   1.8 
 Private  consumption   2.3   2.2   2.2 
 Housing  stock    0.6   0.5   0.3 
Sectoral production 
 Agriculture    1.8   1.9   1.7 
 Iron  &  Steel    0.5   0.7   0.4 
 Chemical  sector    0.9   1.0   0.7 
 Building  materials    0.7   0.7   0.4 
  Non energy intensive sectors    1.6    1.7    1.4 
  Commercial and service sector  1.5    1.9    1.8 
 
4.  THE LOCAL AIR POLLUTION DAMAGE   
We consider the energy-related emissions of NOx, SO2, VOC and particulates, which are the main air 
pollutants. NOx is almost exclusively generated by combustion processes, whereas VOC’s are only 
partly generated by energy using activities (refineries, combustion of motor fuels); other important 
sources of VOC’s are the use of solvents in the metal industry and in different chemical products.     10 
 
The main assumption we use is that, for every pollutant, the marginal local air pollution damage is 
constant over the range considered in our policy analysis. This assumption has been used because 
information on this damage function is scarce as will become clear later. The constant marginal 
damage assumption simplifies the analysis strongly. First this implies that we can limit ourselves to 
the modelling of the emissions of the energy sector as variations in emissions of other sectors will not 
impact the damage and optimal policy results. Second, this simplifies the analysis of some secondary 
pollutants like tropospheric ozone. If the marginal damage of some primary pollutants depends on the 
concentration of another pollutant, it makes the analysis much more complex.  
In order to construct the marginal damage associated to a particular pollutant we need two types of 
information. First we need information on the transformation and transport of emissions into 
depositions and concentrations. This is discussed in the first section. Second we need information on 
the damage functions that translate concentrations into monetary values. This is discussed in the 
second section.  . 
4.1.  Coefficients for the transformation and transport of emissions 
This step establishes the link between a change in emissions and the resulting change in concentration 
levels of primary and secondary pollutants. Because of the transboundary nature of pollutants we need 
to account for the transport of SO2, NOx, VOC and particulates emissions between countries. In the 
case of tropospheric ozone (a secondary pollutant), besides the transboundary aspect, the relation 
between VOC and NOx emissions, the two ozone precursors, and the level of ozone concentration has 
also to be considered. 
Theoretically, the concentration/deposition (IM) at time t of a pollutant ip in a grid g is a function of 
the total antropogenic emissions before time t, some background concentration
8  (BIM) in every 
country c, and other parameters such as meteorological conditions, as derived in models of 
atmospheric dispersion and of chemical reactions of pollutants: 
IM (t) im (EM (t t), BIM (t),..   p, c) , ip,g ip,g p,c ip,g ≡ ′ ≤∀  
For the model, the equations are made static and the problem is linearised through transfer coefficients 
TPC which reflect the effect of the emitted pollutants on the deposition/concentration of a pollutant ip 
in a specific grid, such as to measure the incremental deposition/concentration, compared to a 
reference situation: 
∆ ∆ IM = TPC EM ip,g
pc
p,ip p,c []  , g,c ∑∑ ⋅  
where TPC[g,c] is an element of the transport matrix TPC with dimension GxC. In the model here the 
grid considered is a country and deposition/concentration levels are national averages. 
The transport/deposition coefficients for SO2 and NOx emissions are derived from EMEP budgets for 
airborne acidifying components which represents the total deposition at a receptor due to a specific 
source. Basically, the EMEP model is based on a receptor orientated one layer trajectory (Lagrangian) 
model of acid deposition at 150 km resolution. Characteristics of the various pollutants and their 
transport across countries, as well as atmospheric conditions are taken into account. For particulates, 
Holland (1997) has estimated country to country transfers of primary particulates. His computations 
are based on a simple model which accounts for the dispersion of a chemically stable pollutant around 
a source, including deposition by wet and dry processes. To convert deposition into air concentration, 
use was made of linear relations estimated by Holland (1997).  
Tropospheric ozone is a secondary pollutant formed in the atmosphere through photochemical reaction 
of two primary pollutants, NOx and VOC. The source-receptor relationship is not as straightforward as 
for acid deposition. However, it is recognised (EMEP, 1996, Simpson,1992) that there is a relatively 
                                                      
8  Resulting from natural emissions and emissions from geographic parts that are not included in the country set.    11 
 
strong linearity between change in ozone concentration and change in its precursors emissions (both 
VOC and NOx), allowing an approximation through linear source-receptor relationships. 
It would be useful to include the distinction in the source of emission, for instance between emissions 
from mobile sources and/or low height stationary sources as opposed to high stack sources as it is 
expected that the deposition of pollutants per unit emitted will be different in each case. However, 
there is no information available at this moment that allows making such distinction.  
4.2.  Damage Parameters and their Monetary Valuation 
The damage parameters and their monetary valuation are taken from the ExternE project of the 
European Commission (1997-2000). Therefore the approach followed here is entirely based on the 
framework derived in the project, though at a much more aggregated level. The damage occurs when 
primary (e.g. SO2) or secondary (e.g. ozone ) pollutants are deposited on a receptor (e.g. in the lungs, 
on a building) and ideally, one should relate this deposition per receptor to a physical damage per 
receptor. In practice, dose/exposure-response functions are related to (i) ambient concentration to 
which a receptor is submitted, (ii) wet or dry deposition on a receptor or (iii) ‘after deposition’ 
parameters (e.g. the PH of lake due to acid rain). Following the ‘damage or dose-response function 
approach’, the incremental physical damage DAM per country is given as a function of the change in 
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The damages categories considered in the model are  
1. damage to public health (acute morbidity and mortality, chronic morbidity, but no occupational 
health effect) 
2. damage to the territorial ecosystem (agriculture and forests) and to materials, this last category 
being treated in a very aggregated way. 
The impact on biodiversity, noise or water is not considered, either because there are no data available 
that could be applied in this study or because air pollution is only a minor source of damage for that 
category. 
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The economic valuation of the damage should be based on the willingness-to-pay or willingness to 
accept concept. For market-goods, the valuation can be performed using the market price. When 
impacts occur in non-market goods, three broad approaches have been developed to value the damages. 
The first one, the contingent valuation method, involves asking people open- or closed-ended questions 
for their willingness-to-pay in response to hypothetical scenarios. The second one, the hedonic price 
method, is an indirect approach, which seeks to uncover values for the non-marketed goods by 
examining market or other types of behaviour that are related to the environment as substitutes or 
complements. The last one, the travel cost method, particularly useful for valuing recreational impacts, 
determines the WTP through the expenditure on e.g. the recreational impacts.  
It is clear that measuring environmental costs at the global level as in this model, raises different 
problems, which are extensively discussed in ExternE: transferability of the results from specific 
studies, time and space limits, uncertainty, the choice of the discounting factor, the use of average 
estimates instead of marginal estimates and aggregation. However, despite all these uncertainties, it is 
possible, according to ExternE, to give an informative quantified assessment of the environmental 
costs.     12 
 
4.2.1.  Impact on public health 
The ExternE project retains, as principal source of health damages from air pollution, particulates
9 
resulting from direct emission of particulates or due to the formation of sulphates (from SO2) and of 
nitrates (from NOx), and ozone. They retain also a direct effect of SO2 but no direct impact of NOx 
because it is likely to be small. Direct damages from HC are not yet considered here, because the 
ExternE figures are still at a preliminary stage. The assessment of health impacts is based on a 
selection of exposure-response functions from epidemiological studies on the health effects of ambient 
air pollution (both for Europe and the US). They are reported in the ExternE report (European 
Commission1997-2000).  
For the valuation of the different health impacts, ExternE makes a distinction between morbidity and 
mortality impacts. The valuation of morbidity is based on estimates of WTP to avoid health related 
symptoms, measured in terms of respiratory hospital admissions, emergency room visit, restricted 
activity days, symptom days, etc. They are based on an extensive study of the literature on the costs of 
morbidity, mainly US based. In general the WTP for an illness is composed of three parts: the value of 
the time lost because of the illness, the value of the lost utility because of the pain and suffering and 
the expenditure on averting and/or mitigating the effects of the illness. The costs of illness (COI) is 
measured directly: the actual expenditure associated with the different illnesses plus the cost of lost 
time (working and leisure time). The other cost components, which are more difficult to evaluate, are 
measured by CVM methods (for the value of pain and suffering
10) and models of averting behaviour. 
When no WTP estimates is available, the COI approach was followed and a ratio of 2 for WTP/COI 
for adverse health effects other than cancer and 1.5 for non fatal cancer was assumed. 
For the valuation of the mortality effect, ExternE uses the ‘value of life years lost’ approach (VLYL), 
because the E-R functions used are closer to this concept for most health impacts (see Markandya, 
1997)
11. The valuation figures used in ExternE are summarised in Table 2
12. 
Table 3 : Valuation of mortality and morbidity impacts from ExternE (ECU 1990) 
Mortality   
Statistical life  2600000 
Lost life year  81000 
Acute Morbidity   
Hospital admission for respiratory or cardiovascular symptoms  6500 
Emergency room visit or hospital visit for childhood croup  185 
Restricted activity days (RAD)  62 
Symptoms of chronic bronchitis or cough  6 
Asthma attacks or minor symptoms  31 
Chronic Morbidity   
Chronic bronchitis/asthma in adults  87000 
Non fatal cancer/malginant neoplasm  372000 
Changes in prevalence of cough/bronchitis in children  186 
 
Combining the impact and valuation data, an estimation of the health damage figure per incremental 
pollution can be computed for PM10 en PM2.5 (direct and indirect), for SO2 (direct) and ozone.  
Table 4: Damage from an increase in air pollution (10
6 ECU90 per 1000 persons) 
From an increase of one µg/m
3 of PM10 and nitrite concentration  0.019602 
From an increase of one µg/m
3 of sulphite concentration  0.032397 
                                                      
9  PM10, i.e. particulates of less than 10 µg/m
3 aerodynamic diameter, is taken as the relevant index of ambient particulate concentrations. 
10  The altruistic cost, i.e. pain and suffering to other people is not included in the ExternE figures 
11  The VSL estimates are based on studies of individuals with normal life expectancies whereas the pollution impacts for some kinds of 
mortality were on individuals with much shorter life expectancies. 
12  The latest ExternE figures (1997) are expressed in ECU 1995. They were transformed in ECU 1990 assuming a price increase of 20.8% 
between 1990 and 1995.    13 
 
From an increase of one µg/m
3 of PM 2.5 concentration and Diesel particulates  0.033281 
From an increase of one µg/m
3 of SO2 concentration  0.000540 
From increase of one ppb of ozone concentration  0.001538 
 
4.2.2. Impacts  on  territorial ecosystems and materials 
Because of the great uncertainty around dose response functions and the valuation of the damages, it 
was impossible to derive a damage impact coefficient with a valuation term associated to it for each 
category of damage. Moreover first results from ExternE showed that they were relatively less 
important than public health impact: in the first ExternE evaluation they represented approximately 
25% of total damage from particulates (direct and indirect). Therefore Holland (EU,ExternE, 
REFERENCE?) computed an average damage cost per person from the ExternE detailed computations 
to be used as an indicative value. 
Table 5: Damage from an increase in air pollution (10
6 ECU90 per 1000 persons) 
From an increase of one µg/m
3 of sulphite concentration  0.0028 
From an increase of one µg/m
3 of nitrite concentration  0.0018 
4.3.  Damage from emissions in Belgium 
Combining the figures for the transportation and transformation of pollutants and the figures for the 
damages, one obtains the damage per unit of emission of a primary pollutant. The distinction can be 
made between the damage within the country and the damage across the border, generated by the 
emission of a pollutant in one country. The distinction between domestic and total damage remains 
approximate, because the geographic location of the source can be important. The estimations for 
Belgium are given in the table below. 
Table 6: Damage from emissions in Belgium (10
6 ECU90per kton emission of pollutant) 
  Damage in Belgium  Total damage (in 
Belgium and abroad) 
NOx 0.43  4.58 
SO2 1.29  4.32 
VOC 0.01  0.23 
PM 4.50  14.37 
PM transp (PM2.5)  7.44  23.75 
 
5.  POLICY SCENARIOS 
5.1.  Definition of the policy scenarios 
We consider three policy scenarios addressing local air pollution and global warming. The first one 
focuses on local air pollution only, the second one on GHG emission reductions only and the third 
combines both types of policies. They are compared to a reference scenario in which no environmental 
policy is imposed, neither for local air pollution neither for GHG emission reductions.  
For the local air pollution policy only (LAP scenario), we impose an environmental tax on SO2, NOx, 
VOC and particulates emissions. The tax is set equal to the marginal damage (in Belgium and abroad) 
generated by the pollutant emitted in Belgium, as given in Table 6. A more geographically 
disaggregated model, both at the level of the generation of emissions and at the level of the    14 
 
transformation and transportation of emissions
13, would clearly enhance the analysis because the 
damages from air pollution are ‘location’ dependent. 
For the global warming policy (GHG scenario) a total GHG emission limit is imposed for the Belgian 
energy sector. This cap on emissions corresponds to the EU Kyoto target, translated into a target for 
Belgium through the burden sharing agreement within the EU. This target consists in reducing the 
emissions of greenhouse gasses in 2008-2012 by 7.5% compared to the level of 1990. For after 2010, 
we have assumed that the GHG emissions must continue to decrease at the same rate: in 2030, they 
must be 15% below their 1990 level. We also assume that this target has to be met in Belgium and that 
no tradable permits or other flexible mechanisms can be used to achieve the required reduction in 
Belgium. The links between the reduction of certain pollutants and global warming, e.g. the cooling 
effect of sulphur emissions, should be taken into account in a world scale analysis but is less relevant 
for our country level analysis.  
The third scenario, addressing both local pollution and global warming (LAP-GHG scenario), is a 
combination of the two scenarios. The focus of the comparison of scenarios lies, at this stage, on the 
mutual impact of the policies and not on the definition of optimal environmental policies or the choice 
of policy instruments. 
5.2.   The scenario comparison 
The comparison between scenarios focuses on the cost differences to reach the environmental targets 
and not on the technological options or precise policies needed to implement these policies. The main 
emission results are given in Table 7, the welfare effects are given in Table 8 (for the entire horizon) 
and in Table 9 (per period). 
5.2.1. Emission  results 
Table 7: Emissions of different pollutants in 2010 
(index with emissions reference scenario=100) 
 GHG  NOx  PM  SO2  VOC 
LAP  93 60 48 67 92 
GHG  79 81 80 77 93 
LAP-GHG  79 50 37 52 87 
Reference    100 100 100 100 100 
 
In 2010, the cap on GHG emissions requires an overall reduction of 21% in 2010 (cfr.column 1, line 
GHG of Table 7). A GHG emission reduction only policy would generate an emission reduction of 
approx. 10 to 20% for the most important local air pollutants  (cfr. line GHG in table 7). This has to do 
mainly with two factors. First there is an overall reduction of fossil energy use to meet the GHG 
emission cap. Second, a GHG policy means substitution of coal by natural gas. Natural gas is only half 
as intensive in GHG emissions per unit of energy as coal and coal use generates more SO2 and PM. 
A policy that focuses on local air pollution only would mainly decrease PM, NOX and SO2 by using 
extra abatement measures for large combustion plants and by switching from coal to natural gas. The 
benefit in terms of GHG emission reductions exists but is small (-7%, cfr. Line LAP). 
Optimising both policies jointly leads to the same GHG emissions as a GHG only policy because there 
are (by assumption) no welfare benefits for GHG emission reductions beyond the cap. There are 
however stronger reductions in local air pollutants than in a policy that focuses on local air pollutants 
                                                      
13  in this exercise the country is taken as ‘one’ grid.    15 
 
only. The main reason is that we have a combined effect of a reduction of energy use (of the order of 
20%) and a cleaner energy use. 
5.2.2. Welfare  comparison 
Table 8  Welfare and Environmental Benefits over the entire horizon (1990-2030) 
(10
6ECU90)(differences with reference scenario) 
 LAP  GHG  LAP-GHG
Discounted welfare, excluding environmental benefit(10
6BF) -987.5 -4336.3  -4802.4
Discounted local environmental benefits (10
6BF) 2145.7 1429.2  2805.7
Net welfare effect (10
6BF) 1158.2 -2907.1  -1996.7
 
We start with a reference case where there are no GHG emissions policies in place and also no specific 
air pollution policies with the exception of the existing regulations on cars and large combustion 
plants.  
In table 8, the first line shows the discounted welfare cost (excl. air pollution damages) of 
implementing a given policy. We see that the gross cost (before local air pollution benefits) of 
pursuing local air pollution policies is much smaller than the GHG policy. This can be explained by 
the stringency of the GHG emission targets. Combining both policies has a gross cost that is smaller 
than the sum of the gross costs of the two policies separately. The main reason is that GHG emission 
reduction policies also reduce local air pollutants and vice versa. 
When we take fully into account the marginal damage estimates for local air pollutants (cfr. previous 
section) we see that the current local air pollution policies are too weak, or at least not optimised given 
the damage figures used in this exercice (damage to Belgium and to its neighbouring countries)Indeed 
an optimal local air pollution policy, implemented via emission taxes equal to the marginal damage, 
generates an important net welfare benefit. A small welfare benefit would not be unexpected as the 
model we use assumes optimised and fully informed responses by all agents. The net welfare benefit is 
however too large to be due to model imperfections. This raises questions about the marginal damage 
estimates of air pollution and/or the efficiency of present air pollution policies. The estimation of 
marginal damages remains a hazardous exercise and policy makers may have a different view. There 
are however two reasons why present policies are indeed too weak. First, policy makers use mostly 
technology regulations and this is a less efficient instrument than emission taxes. Second, the local air 
pollution damages are the sum of domestic damages and damages in neighbouring countries (see 
Table 6). The damages in neighbouring countries will only be taken into account if there is an efficient 
international negotiation mechanism at that scale. This is more likely to be the case at the EU level 
than at the world level but still there remains an important transaction cost that may hinder the full 
realisation of all efficiency gains. 
The net benefit of a GHG policy only is negative, no benefits from GHG emissions reductions are 
taken into account in the table. The local air pollution gains are large because the marginal air 
pollution damage per unit of energy used is large when local air pollution policy is not optimised. The 
local air pollution benefits reduce the total cost of the GHG policy by approx. one third.   
Combining both policy objectives still generates a net cost. The net cost is however smaller than in the 
GHG only policy because interesting options to reduce local air pollution damage are now fully 
exploited. The combination of both policies is able to reduce the cost of GHG policies by some 50%. 
The local environmental benefits are higher than in the GHG policy or the local pollution policy alone. 
When we examine the time profile of costs and benefits in Table 9 we need to keep in mind two 
factors. First the GHG emission limit increases over time: in 2010 an emission reduction of 7% is 
required compared to 1990 while in 2030 a reduction of 15% is required. Second less polluting 
equipments are introduced over time in the reference because of the present air pollution emission    16 
 
standards. This explains that in Table 9, the net cost of GHG policies increases over time while the net 
benefits of local air pollution policies do not increase. In 2030, the GHG emission goals are so 
stringent that the local pollution abatement benefits are becoming marginal compared to the GHG 
abatement cost. 
Table 9: Welfare and Environmental Benefit per period 
(undiscounted, differences with reference scenario) 
2010 2020 2030 
Welfare, excluding environmental benefit(106ECU90)   
LAP -257.6 -396.9 -356.6
GHG -713.7 -2652.6 -7707.4
LAP-GHG -843.9 -2733.6 -7765.0
Local environmental benefit (106ECU90)   
LAP +580.0 +711.7 +619.4
GHG +300.8 +772.7 +1289.6
LAP-GHG +754.2 +1101.5 +1298.6
Net welfare benefit (106ECU90)   
LAP +322.4 +314.8 +262.8
GHG -412.9 -1879.8 -6417.9
LAP-GHG -89.6 -1632.1 -6466.4
 
In table 10 we show the marginal cost of the GHG emission reduction constraint. In our model, this is 
also the GHG tax that is needed to attain the emission cap. In the line GHG we see that the marginal 
cost increases over time and this was expected as energy use grows in the baseline and as the emission 
limit becomes more stringent over time. We also see that, when both policies are in place, the GHG 
emission tax needed is smaller, especially in the first period. At the end of the horizon (2030) when the 
local benefits are becoming marginal, the GHG marginal costs are very close in both scenarios     
Table 10: Marginal cost of GHG reduction (ECU90/ton) 
  2010 2020 2030 
GHG 50.9 91.7 297.7 
LAP-GHG 33.6 77.6 298.7 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have examined the interaction between local air pollution policies and GHG reduction 
policies. We considered the case of a country that faces an absolute emission cap for GHG and suffers 
a constant marginal damage from the emissions of five conventional air pollutants. Using a partial 
equilibrium model for energy use and emissions in Belgium, we have three main findings. 
First, we found that present local air pollution policies are too weak when we consider the damage 
estimates. This means that an improved local air pollution policy can generate important net benefits. 
Second , a policy focussing on GHG emissions only has important ancillary air pollution benefits but 
they do not outweigh the costs of the GHG policy. The local air pollution benefits reduce the total cost 
of the GHG policy by approx. one third.  
Third, implementing (and optimising) GHG policies and local air pollution policies jointly is able to 
reduce the cost of GHG policies by some 50%.   
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